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THE OPEN MEETINGS LAW AND 
PUBLIC CONFIDENCE IN GOVERNMENT 
Democracy demands public participation in public 
This principle is all the more important at a time 
when corrupt ion in government has become a major subject of 
public concern. Back-room decision-making lends itself too 
readily to self-dealing and disregard of the public's 
interest. Private discussion and resolution of public 
issues breeds cynicism; cynicism breeds apathy; both 
undermine the accountability of elected officials and erode 
confidence in the integrity of government. 
Pursuant to the Commission's charge that it 
examine "the adequacy of laws, regulations and procedures 
relating to maintaining ethical practices and standards in 
government," "make recommendations for action to strengthen 
and improve" them, 1 and "pursue further the connection 
between openness in government and integrity in 
government, 112 this Commission has examined the Open Meetings 
1 t' Execu i ve Or de r No. 88 . 1 , a t 1 (April 21, 1987) . 
2
state me nt of the Honora ble Ma rio M. Cuomo befo r e the 
Meeting of the Ne w York St a t e Commission on Gove rnme nt I n te -
g rity, a t 9. (S e pte mbe r 9 , 1987). 
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Law3 throughout the State. We have explored the Open 
Meetings Law's effectiveness with citizens, political 
leaders, journalists, and civic groups around the state; we 
have reviewed press reports and the Annual Reports of the 
Committee on Open Government; and on November 4 a nd 5 , 193 7, 
we held public hearings on the law in Rochester, New York. 
Eighteen witnesses testified, both for and against changes 
in the current law. 4 This report reflects the Commission's 
findings and recommendations concerning the important issues 
which emerged from our review. 
The recommendations of the Commission, developed 
below, are the following: 
1. The 1985 amendment to the political caucu s 
exemption of the Open Meetings Law should be 
repealed with respect to local legislative bodies. 
2. Public bodies should be expressly prohibited from 
holding less-than quorum meetings in order to 
circumvent the law. 
3The Open Meetings Law is codified 
Law Sections 100 - 111 (McKinne y 1 98 8) . The 
is set forth in Appendix A to thi s r e port. 
in N. Y. Pub. Off. 
t e xt of tha t l aw 
4A list of these wi tne s s e s, as we ll as a li s t of th e 
mate rials submitted to the Commission for i nclu s i o n i n t he 
r e cord, is at t ached a s Appe ndix B to this Report . A copy of 
those materials, and th e transcipt of the hearings, is o n 
file a t the offices o f the Commission. 
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3. Courts should be authorized to impose civ il fines 
upon public officials who knowingly and 
intentionally violate the Open Meetings Law. 
4. Courts should be authorized to void an action of a 
public body not only if the action is taken in 
violation of the Open Meetings Law but also if 
substantial deliberations relating to the act ion 
are held in violation of that law. 
New York's Open Meetings Law, as first enacted in 
1976, was founded upon the premise that openness and 
integrity are fundamentally linked. The Legislative 
Declaration accompanying the bill proclaimed: 
It is essential to the maintenance of a 
democratic society that the public 
business be performed in an open and 
public manner and that the citizens of 
this state be fully aware of and able to 
observe the performance of public 
officials and attend and listen to the 
deliberations and decisions that go into 
the making of public policy. The people 
must be able to remain informed if they 
are to retain control over those who are 
their public servants. It is the only 
climate under which the commonweal will 
prosper and enable the governmental 
process to operate isor the benefit of 
those who created it. 
Over the y ears, however, a n ame ndment to that law, coupled 
with the l ack of effective me chani s ms t o e n force its 
provisions , h ave dimmed th3t bright prom i se . 
5 N. Y. 
Decla ration) . 
Pub. Off. Law Section 100 
Throughout the 
(Legislative 
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state, people are concerned that the public's business is 
being conducted behind closed doors. 
Some have called this debate "merely" a press 
issue, of little interest to the general public. This 
Commission has been, however, struck again and aga in by the 
public importance of this issue. Citizens have repeatedly 
stressed to the Commission their concern over the propriety 
of municipal bodies closing their meetings to the publi c . 6 
Their concern is also reflected in the fact that during 
1987, of over 2,000 telephone inquiries to the Committee on 
Open Government (the body charged with giving advisory 
opinions on interpretation of the Open Meetings Law), over 
450 came from members of t he general public. The balance of 
the calls were evenly divided betwee n members of the media 
and public officials seeking clarification of their 
obligations. The substantial majority of written advisory 
6 . h. During t i s past summer, 
Commission and two s t aff members 
York Sta te, s peaki ng wit h citizens , 
g roup s , a nd others , to identify 
g reate st importa nc e to New Yo r kers . 
the Cho.irman of the 
t r a v eled throug hout Ne1...; 
r ep r e s e ntatives of civic 
the ethico.l issues of 
-5-
opinions the Cammi ttee issued during the past year were 
responses to inquiries from the public. 7 
The Commission is convinced that this issue cannot 
be dismissed as merely a concern of the press. In this 
case, the concerns of the press are the concerns of the 
public. Many citizens must rely upon the press as their 
eyes and ears at meetings of public bodies. In addition t o 
being the source of information on issues of substance under 
consideration, the press serves as citizens' watchdog for 
the integrity of their elected officials. As we have 
stated in our Preliminary Report on Campaign Financing 
8 Reforms, quoting Justice Brandeis: "Publicity is justly 
commended as a remedy for social and industrial diseases. 
Sunlight is said to be the best of disinfectants; electric 
light the most efficient policeman. 119 The conclusion is 
inescapable that open meetings are crucial to the public's 
confidence in government. 
7
1987 Repor t of the New York St ate Committee on Open 
Government to the Governor .::ind the Legislature a t 32 - 33 . 
8 1. . Pre iminary Report 
issued by the Commi ssion 
21, 1 98 7 a t 32. 
o n C.::impa ign 
On Government 
9 d . Bra n eis, 
Foundation ed . , 
Other People ' s Money 62 
1933) 
Financing 
Integrity , 
Reforms 
December 
(N.::it ' l Home Libr3ry 
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CURRENT LAW 
A. Substantive Provisions 
The New York State Open Meet ings Law requires that 
" [ e] very meet ing of a public body shall be open to the 
general public. 1110 A "meeting" includes the "gathering or 
meeting of a public body for the purpose of · transacting 
public business, whenever a quorum is present, whether or 
not a vote of members of the public body is 11 taken." 
Public bodies must hold their meetings upon public notice 
and must take minutes, which must be available to the 
bl . 12 pu lC. 
enumerated 
Meetings pertaining 
subjects, such 
t o certain specifically 
as collective bargaining 
negotiations and discussions regarding litigation or certain 
personnel matters, may be held in executive session, closed 
10N.Y. Pub . Off . Law Section lOJ( a ). 
11 _O_r_a_n~g~e __ C_o_u_n_t _ _.._y_P_ubl i ca_t:_i~1:2_~_._:::_.:: _ _f_9~n_s.::j_l _?.f _th~_ Ci tY_ o 1 
Newburgh , 6 0 A . D . 2 d ~ 0 9 , 4 l 9 ( 2 d De pt . ) , ci f f ' c:~ , . \ ') ti . '! . ~1 cl 
947 (1 973 ). 
12 N.Y . Pub . Off . La w Sections 104, 10 6 . 
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1 . 13 to the pub ic. But such an executive session may be held 
only upon the majority v ote of the members of the public 
body, taken in an open meeting pursuant to a motion 
identifying the general area of the subject to be 
'd d 14 cons1 ere . Minutes must be kept of any action taken by 
formal vote at an executive session ; those minutes must be 
available to the public. 15 
Three types of proceedings are entirely exempt 
from the requirements of the Open Meetings Law. These 
include most judicial or quasi-judicial d . 16 procee ings ; 
deliberations of political committees, conferences, and 
caucuses (the so-called "political caucus exemption") ; and 
proceedings concerning matters made confidential by federal 
or state law. Since these meetings are exempt, they require 
13N.Y. Pub . Off. Law Section 105 . 
14N.Y. Pub . Off. Law Section 105(1) 
15N.Y. Pub. Off. Law Section 106(2)-(J). 
16 d' Procee ings 
zoning 
exempt 
public. 
boards of 
from the 
N. Y. Pub. 
of the Public Service Commission 
appeals , though quasi-judicial, are 
requirement to hold their meetings 
Off. Law Section 103. 
.ci nd 
not 
in 
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no notice to the public and no minutes need be made 
. l' . 17 available for pub ic review. 
The Open Meetings Law was thus intended to r ef lect 
a balance between the principle that t he public's business 
must be conducted in a public manner, and the recognition 
that certain deliberations of governmental bodies must be 
free from the pressures that accompany publicity. As the 
discussion which follows shows, weaknesses in the current 
law upset that balance. 
B. Interpretation and Enforcement Provisions 
Under the Open Meetings Law, the Committee on Open 
Government, an administra tive agency created under the 
Freedom of Information Law, may issue advisory opinions 
interpreting the provisions of the 18 law. Although these 
advisory opinions are not binding, courts may rely on them 
for guidance in evaluating whether the law has b e en 
violated. During the past ye ar the Committee i s sued 96 
17
see N. Y. Pu b . Off . Luw Section 108 . 
1 8 N.Y. Pb Off u . . 
Of f. Law Sectio n 89 (1) 
LcJw Section 
( Cl ) • 
109 . See Ll.lso N . 'i . ?ub . 
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written opinions and answered 2,077 telephone inquiries 
19 
relating to the law. 
The Open Meet ings Law can be enforced by an 
Article 78 proceeding or an action for a declaratory 
judgment. "Any aggrieved person" complaining o f a violation 
of the Open Meeting Law may bring such an action, and in its 
discretion, upon good cause shown, the court may void the 
action which it finds was taken in violation of that law. 20 
The court may also award costs and reasonable attorney's 
fees to the successful 21 party. No other remedy 
violations of the Open Meetings Law currently exists. 
ISSUES RAISED BY THE COMMISSION'S INVESTIGATION 
for 
Several substantial issues have emerged from the 
Commission's investigation of the operation of the Open 
Meetings Law. 
19 1987 Report of the New York State Committee on Open 
Government to the Governor and the Legislature at J2. 
20 N.Y. Pub . Off. Law Section 107 (1). 
21 N. Y. Pub . Off . Law Section 107 (2). 
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First, an amendment to the political caucus 
exemption enacted in 1985, discussed in detail below, is of 
vital concern to the public because it can, under present 
law, be invoked by the majority party in every local 
legislative body in the state, from the smallest village to 
the largest city, to allow the public's business to be 
determined in a private meeting. 
Second, enforcement mechanisms in the law are 
insufficient. Although the Open Meetings Law authorizes the 
courts to void, in whole or in part, any action taken in 
violation of the law, it contains no other enforcement 
mechanism. Furthermore, and directly contrary to the spirit 
of the law, it provides no remedy at all if an action is 
taken in public but the deliberations leading to that action 
are conducted entirely in private. 
Finally, the current law contains no remedy for 
certain conduct intended to circumvent the law's provisions . 
This issue surfaced whenever repeal of the 19 85 amendmen t t o 
the political caucus exemption was d iscussed , si nce some 
loca l legislative bodies, befo r e the 1985 ame nd me nt, hlld 
tried to circumvent a cou r t interpretati o n of the scope ot 
the excepti on by holding a series of l ess -th<:ln - quorum 
-11-
meetings which together served as a single gathering of more 
than a quorum of the public body. 
The Commission's investigations, including the 
Rochester hearings, have led us to conclude that each of 
these issues represents a serious deficiency in the current 
Open Meetings Law and undermines public confidence in 
government. 
A. The Political Caucus Exemption 
Of all the open meetings issues, the "political 
caucus" exemption in Section 108 has been the focus of the 
most intense debate. Over the years, its scope has been the 
subject of litigation, an advisory opinion from the 
. 
Committee on Open Government, an amendment to the statute 
vastly extending the applicability of the exemption, and, 
now, calls for repeal or modification of the amendment. 
1. History of the Political Caucus Exemption 
As e nac ted in 1976 , the Ope n Meetings L,1w simply 
exempted the "de l iberations of political committees, 
-12-
conferences and 22 caucuses." The question soon arose 
whether that exemption permitted members of the same 
political party to meet in private to discuss public 
business, even if they constituted a majority of a public 
body. 
a. The Sciolino Decision. In 1980, Anthony 
Sciolino, the sole Republican member of the Rochester City 
Council, sought access to certain closed meetings of the 
Council's Democratic caucus, where the Democratic majority 
received information relating to city government matters 
likely to come before the entire Council, and then discussed 
23 those matters. Sciolino argued that these meetings of the 
Democratic majority were meetings of the Council to transact 
public business, and that neither he nor the public should 
be excluded. Both the trial and appellate courts agreed. 
As the Appellate Division stated, the political caucus 
exemption: 
was meant to prevent the statute from 
extending to the private matte r s o f a 
political party, as opposed t o matters 
22 Act of July 20 , 1976, ch. 511 , 1976 N. Y. Laws 1173, 
1175, now codified in N. Y. Pub. Off. Law Section 103(2) (a) . 
23 . 1. . See Scio ino v . Ryan, 103 M.Lsc . 2d 1021 
Mo nroe County, 1980) , aff ' d , 8 1 A. D. 2d at 476 - 77 
1981). See also Tr . a t 413 - 14 . 
(Sup . Ct . , 
(4th Dept . 
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which are public business yet discussed 
by political party members. To allow 
the majority party members of a public 
body to exclude minority members, and 
thereafter conduct public business in 
closed sessions under the guise of a 
political ca~~us, would be violative of 
the statute. 
To comply with the letter of the court's ruling, the 
Democratic members of the Council thereafter sometimes split 
their caucus into two groups, the membership of which would 
rotate from meeting to meeting, so that no quorum of the 
entire Council would be present at any one time. 25 
b. The 1985 Amendment. Some four years after 
Sciolino, in response to a request from the New York Post, 
the Committee on Open Government, relying on Sciolino, 
issued an advisory opinion concluding that caucuses held by 
a majority of the members of either house of the New York 
State Legislature for the purpose of conducting public 
business are subject to the Open Meetings 26 Law. 
Legislative response to that interpretation was swift and 
24 . 1. 
_S_c_i_o __ i_n_o_ v_ . _R~y~a_n , 8 1 A . D. 2 d <l t 4 7 9 . 
25Transcript of Hearings held by Commission on 
Government Integrity, Novembe r 4 - 5 , 1987 (hereinaft e r c ite d 
as "Tr.") at JJ , 463 - 69 , 43 5 - 86 , 530 , 543 - 44 . 
26 . . Committee on Ope n Government , Advisory Opinion No. 
OML-A0-1158 (April 11, 1985). 
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dramatic. Less than six weeks later, the Rules Committees 
of the Senate and Assembly introduced a bill to overturn the 
opinion; the bill was passed by both houses a week later; 
. d ' t 'th' h 27 Governor Cuomo signe i wi in 2 4 ours. 
That law, commonly referred t o as "the 198 5 
amendment," exempted from the Open Meetings Law all "private 
meeting(s] of members of the senate and assembly of the 
state of New York who are members or adherents of the 
same political party .... " The exemption applied 
without regard to (i) the subject matter 
under discussion, including discussions 
of public business, (ii) the majority or 
minority status of such political 
committees, conferences and caucuses, or 
(iii) whether such political committees, 
conferences and caucuses invite staff or 
guests to pa~gicipate i n their 
deliberations .... 
The amendment also applied to the legislative body of every 
county, city, town, and vill a ge in the State. 
27 S- 6 28 4, A- 7804 was i ntroduced i n both houses on Ma y 
23 , 1985; it wa s pa s sed by both h ouses o n May JO , 1985 , and 
s i g ned into l aw o n May 31, 1985 . 
28 N. Y. Pub . Off. Law Section 108(2 ) (b ). 
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c. Post-1985 Experiences. The 1985 amendment had 
an almost immediate impact upon the access of the public to 
meetings of local legislative bodies. The majority members 
of the Rochester City Council, for example, resumed their 
pre-Sciolino practice of holding closed 29 caucuses. Many 
other bodies, which had previously met in public, began to 
close their doors. In a January 1986 poll of daily 
newspapers across the state conducted by the New York 
Newspaper Publishers Association, twenty of the 44 
newspapers responding reported closed-door meetings by 
public bodies that had been open before May 31, 19 85. 30 
2. Arguments For And Against Chanqe 
At our hearings in Rochester, the arguments both 
for and against the political caucus exemption were 
addressed. Even one eloquent spokesman for closed caucuses 
testified that "there should be a presumption for 
29 The Rochester City Counse l recently r esolved that it 
"will conduct Ope n Mee tings as ma nda ted prior to adoption of 
the [1985] ame ndme nt." Roches t e r City Counci l Resolution 
No. 87 -35 (Octo ber 13 , 1987). See a l s o Tr. u t 482-83, 
536 -37. 
30
see Responses to NYNSPA Survey "Cl osed 
Pa rty Caucuses of Loca l Legislative Bodies " (J<J.n . 
copy of which is o n file with the Commission . 
Political 
19 8 6) I d 
-16-
31 
openness." Elsewhere he wrote, "New York State law 
creates a presumption that public business be done in 
public, and this is a good idea. Democracy works best when 
decision-makers can be held accountable by citizens for 
their actions. " 32 
There was, however, recognition that the maxim 
that public business should be conducted in public cannot be 
universally applied. The proponents of closed caucuses 
articulated a number of significant policy reasons for their 
position. Most witnesses at the Rochester hearing -- both 
elected officials and representatives of good government 
groups and the media recognized that some measure of 
deliberative privacy in the legislative process is proper, 
even at possibly critical points in reaching a decision. 
The opponents of repeal of the political caucus amendment 
argue that the voters, in electing legislators to r e present 
them, necessarily a llow them latitude of judgment in the 
performa nce of their responsibility , and that some 
discretion to secure information and exp lore issue s with 
Jl Tr. a t 127 . 
J 2Benj amin, " Co n fidentiality for Po l i ti cal Caucuses, " 
Empire State Report, at 46 (July 1984) . 
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colleagues in such meetings as they consider most productive 
is appropriate. 
This Commission does not take issue with the 
general proposition that some degree of deliberative 
privacy, such as under the circumstances spelled out in · 
other sections of the Open Meetings Law, is appropriate. We 
conclude, however, that in the context of meetings of a 
majority of the members of a legislative body, whose 
decisions can become the decisions of the body a s a whole , 
the public's right to know what is being discussed and 
decided is more compelling than the lawmaker's interes t in 
deliberating in private. 
a. Impact on Deliberations. The primary 
justification advanced for closed caucuses is that members 
of public bodies need to discuss in private their views on 
public issues in order to reach a consensus. As one 
political scientist and local legislator has wri tten, " a 
degree of confidentiality is needed to facilitat e a free 
exchange of idea s before a decision is 3' reached ." _, 
J J ' ' . . . . . Ben] a min, " Co nfident iality for Po litica l Caucuses, 11 
Empire State Report , a t 46 (July 1984) (emphasis original) . 
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Similarly, according to the supervisor of one upstate town, 
"fear of misrepresentation [by the press] tends to stifle 
free discussion and speculative thought among public 
officials; so that, the intellectual level of a discussion 
is lowered and the best synthesis may be lost. 11 34 Some 
political leaders have also argued that opening caucuses 
could inhibit a member of a legislative body from asking 
questions that might give the appearance that the member is 
. d . 11' 35 un1nforme or un1nte igent. 
But, in practice, open caucuses do not appear to 
interfere with the spirited debate of public issues. For 
example, when asked whether opening caucuses during the 
period after Sciolino and before the 1985 amendment real ly 
made any difference in the way issues were discussed, a 
representative of the Association of Counties testified 
before us, "I don't think it had any significant change, to 
be very honest At the county level I really don't 
think there was a major reaction to it or benefit from it or 
34Memorandum 
Pittsford, dated 
Commission. 
by Paul 
" about 
M . Spiege l, 
Feb . 1986 ," 
Supervisor, Town of 
on file with the 
35 See Tr. at 26 -27, Jl - 32 , 269-71, 511 -1 2, 534, 548 - 50 . 
But see Tr. a t 563-64. 
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't f 't 1136 advers i y rom i . A representative of the New York 
Conference of Mayors and Other Municipal Officials similarly 
stated, "I'm not sure it had an overly dramatic change on 
the overall process itself. 1137 
In our judgment, the public is entitled to make an 
informed decision about the quality of its representa tives, 
and cannot do so if the significant deliberations of those 
representatives are held behind closed doors. In Anthony 
Sciolino's words, "The public has a right to know who's 
contributing, who's not; who's being petty, who's being 
statesmanlike. Unfortunately, when the door is closed 
nobody knows who is doing the job. 1138 In fact, discussions 
of the most difficult and controversial issues a re pre cise l y 
those that legislators might most want to hold in priva te --
such as the location of low-income housing or a ma j o r 
waterfront development, removal of asbestos f rom school s , 
solid waste disposal, or incre a s es in their sa l a ries . These 
are discussions in which the public ha s grea t inte r es t a nd 
lB . 
36T r. 
37 T r. 
a t 258. 
a t 258 . 
See also Tr . at 565 - 66 . 
38 Roche ster Democ r at a nd Chronicle , Sept . 23 , 1986 , at 
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wh ich should clearly be held in public. These are issues 
which have, on occasion, been discussed behind closed doors. 
Yet, because the provisions exempting caucuses do not 
contain any requirements for giving notice or taking 
minutes, it is difficult if not impossible to know for sure 
when such caucuses have occurred. 
The deliberations of public officials also show 
why, not merely how, a particular legislator voted on a 
particular issue. Closed caucuses prevent the public from 
knowing what considerations led to the decisions of the 
majority of a legislative body, what alternatives the 
members of that body examined, and what consequences they 
. h d 39 weig e . 
b. Effect On The Two-Party System. Secondly, 
proponents in favor of the political caucus exemption have 
39 Proponents of closed caucuses respond that a 
legislator will normally consider it necessary to explain 
a nd justify a vote on a crucial issue, typically in open 
debate at the meeting of the f ull body or in statements to 
the media before or afte r the vote, and tha t, if legislators 
do not adequately account for their performance, then their 
constituents, who h ave the greatest s take in the matter , can 
vote them out of office . In the Commission's vi e w, such 
a fter-the-fact statements may not reflect the true motives 
of the legislator as fully as does the actual de liberative 
discu ssion . 
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argued that open caucuses weaken parties and thereby the 
40 two-party system. One commentator has explained that the 
majority political party in a leg is la ti ve body "needs a 
confidential forum in which its members can frankly discuss 
alternatives and hammer out compromises. Applying the open 
meeting law to political caucuses inhibits intraparty 
compromise" on issues and thereby inhibits the ability of 
the majority to forge a policy position for which the 
. 't . ' t . 'bl 41 maJori y, as maJori y, is responsi e. 
This argument, in our view, does not withstand 
close scrutiny. First, no one who made this claim could 
provide the Commission with a concrete example of party 
structures having suffered these adverse conse quences as a 
result of open caucuses. 
Furthermore, any arguably positive effect s that 
closed caucuses might have upon intraparty s trength are 
outweighed by their palpable negative effects upon 
40 See Tr. a t 34 - 35 , 132 , 
54 3-44. But see Tr . a t 89 - 90 , 
14 5 . See al so_ Tr . at 497 - 99 , 
105 - 107, 213 - 14, 466-67. 
41 Benj a m in , " Confidentiality 
Empire State Report, at 4 6 (July 
466 - 67 . 
for Political Cci.ucuses," 
1 984 ) . _B_u_t ~_e_e Tr . a t 
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interparty vitality, at least in those numerous localities 
in New York where the minority party is vastly outnumbered 
by the majority. In those communities, to the extent tha t 
information relevant to the public's business is conveyed in 
private meetings of the majority, excluded minority members 
are deprived of information vital to their informed 
participation in the public debate which is essential to the 
proper functioning of the two-party system. In these 
circumstances, closed caucuses may in fact weake n the 
system. 
This handicap is not merely speculative. The sole 
Republican member of the Rochester City Council vividly 
described before us the impact of excluding new minority 
which public members from majority 
business lS discussed~ 
political caucuses 
She stated that 
at 
the Democra t ic 
majority in the Rochester City Council r e gul a rly obtained 
"agenda briefings" by staff a nd others, brief i ngs t o wh i c h 
she was not privy. The topics of such closed caucus 
briefings i ncluded a n industrial expans ion i n that same 
Republican member' s district , a r eview of the proposed line 
item school budget by the s uper intende nt of schools and 
s chool board , a nd a sta t eme nt by a utility representative o n 
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42 that utility's stand on a proposed reassessment program. 
"Now, I consider that [lack of information] a handicap to 
serving the constituents in [my] distric t", t h e minori t y 
member testified. 43 
The handicap i s i ncreased when· the lawmake r is 
excluded from meetings at which, for all practical purposes, 
the issues are decided. The same witness stated, "My 
exclusion prevents me from representing my c ons tituent s 
adequately because city policy questions are decided at 
44 
closed meetings outside my presence." As an e xample, she 
discussed how, at the same time that she was meeting with 
community representatives on the location of a controversial 
food bank in her own c ouncil d istrict, the majority members 
of the Council met in closed caucus and decide d tha t very 
t . 45 ques ion. 
The proponents of closed caucuse s re spond that 
this handicap might actuall y increa se if the 1985 a me ndment 
42T r. a t 4 14-1 7 , 428 - 29 . 
43T r. at 415 . 
44 T r. a t 41 4 . 
4 5T r. a t 41 8 - 19 . 
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were repealed. Discussions would lawfully t ake place in 
smaller groups, in telephone conversations, and in informal 
communications among key leaders. To the extent that 
discussions of public issues were displaced from the caucus 
to other channels of communication, some legislators would 
receive less information and would have less opportunity to 
participate in crucial decisions, and collective party 
responsibility would be blurred. 
We do not agree. In our view, 
discussions of even critical issues 
a series of private 
of substance is 
qualitatively different than a single gathering of a 
majority of a public body, where the majority discusses and 
even decides the public business. The majority can make 
decisions; smaller groups of lawmakers cannot. 
Some witnesses t e stifying before the Commission 
also suggested that the pre-1 985 Open Meetings Law unfairly 
discriminated against the majority part y, since only the 
majority was prohibited from discussing public business in 
closed session . 
as having said: 
One Rochester City Council member is quoted 
"It' s like telling the winning te am a t half 
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time that it can't go into the locker room to discuss 
strategy for the second half while the losing team can. 1146 
The differing impact open caucus requirements may 
have on the majority than on the minority party is, in the 
Commission's view, justifiable. As the Democratic minority 
leader of the Monroe County Legislature pointed out, the 
majority party has an obligation different from that of the 
minority. What the majority decides in caucus lS, 
effectively, the decision of the legislative body itself. 47 
Particularly in politically lopsided bodies, closed caucuses 
effectively preclude any meaningful debate between opposing 
parties: the real business may be conducted behind c losed 
doors, and the public meeting may become a pro forma 
. 48 
exercise. 
c. Impact on Integrity in Gove rnme nt. Some 
perceive the need for private conferences among lawmakers 
and elected officials to be so great that secret meetings 
8 B. 
46 Rochester De moc r at a nd Chronicle , Nov . 1 2 , 1 986 , at 
47T r. a t 336 - 37 . 
48
s ee T t 3 r. a 13, 317, 319 , 5 5 5 , 557 
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will be held no matter what the law provides. In this vein, 
it has been argued that prohibiting closed caucuses which 
discuss public business would encourage disrespect for the 
49 law, since the majority party would seek a way to disobey 
or evade it. A former Rochester City Council member 
testified, "[A]bolition of closed caucuses is sheer 
1 
hypocrisy. You'll never abolish them .... [I]f abolished in 
one form, [they] would only be held in a~other, even if at 
midnight in my basement behind the furnace. 1150 
Again, the Commission does not agree. Perhaps the 
most compelling reason for abandoning the political caucus 
exemption lies precisely in its impact upon the appearance 
of integrity in government. The public almost invariably 
perceives closed door meetings of public bodies as evidence 
that the members of that body have something to hide. That 
perception alone lends an appearance of impropriety to such 
a meeting and detracts from public confidence in the 
integrity of public officials. When such closed door 
meetings involve a number of lawma ke rs sufficient to decide 
49 See Governor ' s Memo r a ndum o n 
19 8 5 , ch . 13 6 , 19 8 5 N • Y . L.::i w s 4 6 2 , 
Laws 3283 (McKinney's) 
50 Tr. a t 530 . 
approving Act of May 31, 
rep r oduced at 1 9 85 N . 1 . 
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a public issue, and take place without notice, mi nutes, or a 
clear delineation of the issues considered, that appearance 
of impropriety is heightened. 51 Until 1985, the 
circumstances in which closed meetings of legislative bodies 
could be held were circumscribed by law to re flect fairly 
narrow areas, with clear procedural safeguards. Since the 
1985 amendment, the bounda ries are far less clear, and the 
public's confidence in its lawmakers suffers. 
The remedy to the temptation to try to meet behind 
closed doors to debate and decide public issues, the 
Commission believes, is a clearer statement in the law that 
such attempts are prohibited, together with improved 
enforcement mechanisms . With those changes, the Commission 
is confident that lawmakers will strive to obey, not flout, 
the law. 
B. Enforcement Issues 
Several e nforc ement-related i ssue s eme r ged dur ing 
the course of the Commission' s investigati o n. 
51 See ge nerally Tr . a t 72 , 76 - 77 , 385, 471- 7 2 . 
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A number of witnesses described situations, during 
the period after Sciolino, but before the 1985 amendment, 
where the attendees at closed caucus meetings would be 
systematically rotated so tha t there would never be a quorum 
52 present. Al t hough s uch a practice clearly violate s the 
spirit of the Open Meetings Law in e ffect prior to the 1985 
amendment, it appears to ~ave technically complied with the 
law's provisions. These provisions clearly pose problems 
for those required to enforce a version of the Open Me e tings 
Law that resembles the law prior to the 1985 amendment. 
Second, by providing no remedy for violation of 
the Open Meetings Law other than by a court p roce eding to 
void the public body's action, the law in its prese nt s t a t e 
allows members of public bodies knowingly to viol a t e i ts 
provisions with virtual impunity. Any action voided by a 
court after litiga tion c a n be rein s t a ted b y the public body 
at a later public meeting which may be pro 53 f o rma ; the 
5 2 See Tr. a t 33 , 468 - 69 , 485 - 86 , 53 0, 543 - 44 . 
53 See , ~S_:_ , _Qombr C2~..:is.~_._Board of Educati_?_!J , 118 Misc . 
2d 8 00, 8 0 4 (Sup . Ct ., Ono ndag a Co u nty , 19 83 ) A 
s ubcommitt e e o f t h e Boa rd of Edu ca t ion, consisting of more 
t han the ma j o r ity of the Board , met many times in secre t to 
discuss a n i s sue , a n d made a recomme ndatio n to the ful 1 
Boa r d . The Boa rd then met publicly and approveu the 
(Footnote Continued) 
lawmakers themselves suffer no penalty. So basic is this 
weakness that even one of the strongest advocates of closed 
caucuses testified in Rochester that, if an open meetings 
law exists, it should be enforced by individual penalties. 
. f' 54 That witness supported ines. 
Third, the stad1te does not authorize courts to 
void an action taken in violation of the Open Meetings Law 
when the deliberations preceding an action of a public body 
have been held behind closed doors in violation of the Open 
Meetings Law but the action was taken at a public meeting 
which complied with the Law. 
The law is clear that delibera tions of a public 
body held behind closed doors, unless they fa ll within the 
Law's exceptions or exemptions, violate the Open Meet ings 
(Footnote Continued) 
recommendation. The ~ourt declined to void that decision, 
saying, "a p rior violation of the Open Meetings Law does not 
taint a subsequently he ld l egal mee ti ng at which the 
questio ned acti o n i s ta ke n." 
5 4 Tr . a t 5 2 - 5 4 • See a 1 so Tr . ,"'l t J ~ ') , i ·1 G - ·+ 7 . The 
effective ness of such - f inespr obably 1 i es less in the 
t hreatened monetary loss tha n in the almos t ccrtJjn 
embarrassment to a p~blic official resulting f rom the r e por t 
o f the f ine o n t he fro n t page o f t he 1 o c ·1 l n e \-Is p u pc r . :~ c' c' 
Tr . a t 7G , 2 08 - 209 . 
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Law. 55 Nonetheless, private meetings are sometimes held to 
resolve all differences, with the later public action of the 
legislative body becoming simply a perfunctory exercise. 
Under current law, while an "aggrieved person" may litigate 
to obtain a declaratory judgment that this practice is 
unlawful, the court in such a case has no power to void the 
!56 
action of the public body·! 
55 Orange County Publications v. City of Newburgh, 4 5 
N.Y. 2d 942, 948, aff'g, 60 A.D. 2d 409, 40, N.Y.S. 2d 84 
(2d Dept. 1978). (The Open Meetings Law applies to the 
entire decision-making process, not merely formal acts of 
voting or formal executions of documents. The Court 
declared that: 
The Open Meetings Law was obviously 
designed to assure the public's right to 
be informed. Accordingly, any private 
or secret meetings or assemblages of the 
Council of the City of Newburgh, when a 
quorum of its members is present and 
when the topics for discussion and 
eventual decision are such as would 
otherwise arise at a regular meeting, 
are a violation o f the New York Open 
Meetings Law.) 
56
see Dombroske v . Boa!:.L~L Edu~9_tior:i_, 113 Misc. :2d 
800 , 804 (Sup. Ct., Onond~ga County, 1983). 
----------- ----- - - --------------------
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THE COMMISSION'S RECOMMENDATIONS 
After hearing all the viewpoints so persuasively 
expressed at its Rochester hear in gs, and considering the 
variety of contexts in which these issues are presented: the 
Commission on Government Integrity makes t he following 
recommendations. 
A. The 1985 Amendment to the Political 
Caucus Exemption Should Be Repealed 
With Respect to Local Legislative Bodies. 
The Commission is convinced that the 1985 
amendment to the political caucus exemption should be 
repealed as it pertains to local legislative bodies. 
Some individuals and groups, including the New 
York Conference of Mayors and Other Municipal Offici a ls, the 
Association of Counties, and the As sociation of Towns, have 
argued against any change in the law that would treat 
counties, cities, towns, and v il lag es differently from th e 
State . 57 Legislature . The Commi s sion, however, has no 
authority to investiga t e the management or affa irs of the 
5 7 Tr. a t 227 - 29 , 234 , 236 , 252 - 55 , 239 - 90 . 
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State Legislature and there fore makes no recommendation 
concerning amending the law as to that 58 body. On the 
merits, we are convinced that as to the local jurisdictions 
we are empowered to consider, the amendment should be 
repealed. 
Opponents of r epeal of the 198 5 amendment have 
voiced the view that any decision whether to i nvoke the 
broad political caucus e xemption e xpressed in current law 
should be left to the local legislative bodies themse l ves. 59 
They argue that the local legislators who h a ve bee n elected 
by the people of the community to r e present the m s h ou l d be 
allowed to exercise their discret i on in t h i s regard ; if the 
representatives abuse their privilege of d e liberative 
privacy a nd refuse to open their delibera tions to reasonable 
public scrutiny, the remedy shou l d l ie with the local 
58The p rovisi on of the App r opr i a t ions Bill which 
allocated funds to thi s Commiss i on expressl y stated : 
no f unds pu r suant to the app r opriation 
may be u s ed to fund the work of any 
c ommi s sio n whi c h has o ne of its purposes 
t h e inv es t iga t ion of the management or 
a f f airs of t h e Leg i s l a t ure .... 
198 7 New York St ate App r opria t ions Bill , ut 497 . 
59
see Tr. at 53-54, 191. 
444 - 4 5, 463 , 571 - 73 . 
But see Tr. at 99, 
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voters, who have the most direct interest and the greatest 
ability to evaluate the performance of their legislative 
representatives. They also observe that repeal as to local 
governments would be especially offensive to home rule 
principles if the State legislature were to maintain the 
exemption for itself. 
Witnesses favoring repeal of the amendment 
responded to that argument by emphasizing the p aramount 
importance of openness in the legislative process to both 
the appearance and the reality of integrity of e lected 
ff . . 1 60 0 lCla S. For all the reasons discussed above, this 
Commission agrees, and is not pers u aded tha t t o leave t h e 
question to local option would be effective. The efforts o f 
the New York State League of Women Voters d e mons trat e th e 
difficulties inherent . in trying to lobby for city - by- c ity 
changes . 61 in the law. Moreover, even those publ ic bod i es 
60The analogy has been drawn to the Freedom of 
Information Law, which a pplies t o e v e ry munci pa l i t y of t h e 
State . The Freedom of Info r ma tion La w is codif i ed a t N. Y. 
Pub. Off. Law Sections 8 4- 9 0 (McK inney 19 8 8) . 
61
soon after th e passage of the 1985 ame ndme nt, l o c al 
Leagues . o f Wom en Vote r s t hroughou t New York St i:l te bega n 
s eeking to p e r s u a de counti es , ci t ies , t own, .:i nd vi l l a ges 
(which numbe r some 16 1 6 juris dictio ns ) to r e no unce the nc·.,; 
l aw . Onl y about 60 local mun icipalities ( less tt1a n h d l f 
(Footn o t e Co nt i nued) 
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that today pass an open meetings resolution may tomorrow 
rescind it, particularly should the open meetings become a 
political liability. 
The Commission also carefully considered whether 
some different formulation of the political caucus exemption 
might more effectively b a lance the competing interests at 
stake. Its investigation revealed widespread acceptance of 
the notion that some number of the members of the s ame 
political party should be allowed to meet and discuss public 
issues in private. Many witnesses before us agreed that two 
members of the same party should be permitted to discuss 
public business in private. The heart of the debate, 
however, lies in where, past that number, the line is to be 
drawn between legitimately private discussions and meetings 
which should be open .to the public. The pre-1985 law used 
(Footnote Continued) 
those contacted by the local Leagues) adopted resolutions 
either requiring the governing bodies to meet in public or 
committing the municipality to abide by the pre - 19 35 law . 
The League, observing that its effo r ts on the local level 
we re having a . minima l impact statewide, s hifted it s ope n 
meeting efforts to the State Legislature . Tr . ut ::'.O'J - 1 0 , 
219-21. See also Tr. a t 294 - 95 , 582 - 83 . 
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the majority of the relevant body as the trigger point; 
Governor Cuomo has proposed two-thirds. 62 
The Commiss ion has considered each of these 
alternatives, as well as the suggestion of linking the 
maximum permissible size of a closed caucus to the si ze of 
the aff irrnative vote required to pass the matter under 
discussion. On balance, the Commission favors simply a 
62 The Governor's most recent proposal would require 
that political caucuses discussing public business be open 
to the public when two-thirds or more of the total 
membership of the legislative body is present. A . 7 4 6 O , 
introduced by Committee on Rules at request of Asemblyma n 
Zimmer on May 4, 1987. See also s. 4870, introduced by 
Senator Donovan on April ~ 1987. Thus, for example, "if 
the makeup of a legislature was split 60-40 between the ~wo 
parties, the caucuses of both parties could be closed." 
Memorandum accompanying Governor's Program Bill No. 69, at 
2-3 (1987). That two-thirds rule is justified on "the basis 
of a strong two-party system[, which] should act to ensure 
that public business is not conducted behind closed doors ." 
Id., at 3. 
That conclusion, however, may not be correct. The 
fact that the majority party constitutes l ess than 
two-thirds of the members of the legislative body does not 
necessarily signify a strong t wo-party sys t e m. Th e 
remaining members may be split amo ng two or more parties, 
may be politically weak, or may in fact be aligned with the 
majority. Particularly in smaller municipalities it is not 
unusual for a registered Democrat or Republican to run for 
election as a n independent or eve n on th e opposi ng party ' s 
slate. Even the presence of a strong two - party system 
hardly guarantees open caucuses, especially in those 
municipalities with a tradition of closed caucuses or where 
the holding of closed caucuse s benefits both parti es . 
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return to the formulation which was in effect after Sciolino 
63 
and prior to the 1985 amendment. 
B. Intentional Circumvention of the Law Should 
Be Expressly Prohibited in the Statute 
Wherever the line is drawn requiring the doors to 
: 
meetings to be opened, i t is evident that the problem of 
deliberately structuring meetings to comply with the letter 
but not the spirit of the law must be addressed. 
To discourage a recurrence of the kind of 
subterfuge that took place before the 1985 amendment, the 
Commission recommends that public bodies be prohibited from 
holding less-than-quorum meetings in order to circumvent the 
64 law. This prohibition should be explicitly stated in the 
63 For the reasons discussed herein Commissioner James 
L. Magavern does not concur in the Commission's 
recommendation to repeal the 1985 amendment to the political 
caucus exemption as it pertains to local legislative bodies. 
64
see N.J. Rev. Stat. Section 10:4-11 ("No person or 
public body shall fail to invite a portion of its members to 
a meeting for the purpose of circumventing the provisions of 
this act"). The same purpose could possibly be accomplished 
in New York by adding the following sentence subdivision one 
of to Section 102 of the Open Meetings Law: 
The convening, whether officially or 
unofficially, of less than a quorum, shall be 
(Footnote Continued) 
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law to avoid ambiguity and to put public officials on 
notice. While we recognize that there may be some 
situations where the difference between a permissible 
private conference and an intentional effort to evade the 
law is not crystal clear, in most cases the issue will be 
relatively clear. In our judgment, such distinctions are 
best left to the courts o~ the Committee on Open Government 
to judge in the context of particular circumstances. 
c. Civil Penalties Should Be Imposed On 
Individuals Who Intentionally Violate The Law 
Many witnesses testified that the penal ties for 
violation of the Open Meetings Laws which consist solely of 
possible court orders voiding actions taken in violation of 
the Law's provisions / were insufficient. This Commission 
agrees. Accordingly, the Commission recommends that courts 
be authorized to impose civil fines upon public officials 
(Footnote Continued) 
a meeting for purposes of this article if the 
number of members present is limited to less 
than a quorum in order to circumvent the 
requirements of this article and public 
business is discussed. 
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who knowingly and intentionally violate the Open Meet ings 
65 Law. 
Fines against individual public officials have 
precedent in New York law, in comparable . 66 ci rcumstances. 
Other states have established fines for violations of their 
: 
open meetings laws - for ;example, up to $500 in New Jersey 
for repeat offenders and up to $1,000 in . 67 Connecticut. 
65This recommendation could possibly be implemented by 
adding a new sentence to the first paragraph of subdivision 
one of Section 107 of the Open Meetings Law, to read as 
follows: 
66 
In such action or proceeding, the court 
shall also have the power to impose a 
fine upon any member of the public body 
who has knowingly and intentionally 
violated any provision of this article. 
Such fine shall not exceed $100 for the 
first viol.ation and $200 for each 
succeeding violation committe d within a 
period of eighteen months. Notwith-
standing any provision of law to the 
contrary, no government entity shall 
indemnify a ny such member f or payment o f 
any such fine. 
See, ~' Pub. Off. Law Sec t ion 79 (fa il ure to 
perform a public duty enjoined by specia l p rovision of law). 
See also Ethics in Gov e rnme nt Act, ch . 813 , 1 98 7 N. Y. Laws 
1404, 1407-140 8 , 1411, 1 420 - 21 , 1424-25 , 1430-31, 1447, 
1450 - 51 . 
6 7 N.J. Rev. Stat . Secti o n 10 : 4 - 17 ; Co nn. Gen . Stat . 
Section l- 2li (b) 
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Violation of the Nevada open meetings law is a misde-
68 
meanor. 
Governor Cuomo has proposed a fine of up to $100 
where a court hearing an open meetings law case finds t hat 
the public body or any of its members engaged in a pattern 
of violations or a flagr~nt disregard of the Open Meetings 
Law. In such a case, the fine would be payable by each 
member who knowingly or intentionally engages in the 
. 1 t. 69 v10 a ion. The .Commission believes that this standard of 
proof is unnecessarily strict, and that a fine should be 
imposed simply for any knowing and intentional violation of 
the Open Meetings Law . 
Such a rule would adequately protect individuals 
against uncertainties. in the law and against di ff icul ties 
that volunteer, part-time officials may have judging its 
application to particular facts. Under this provision, 
legislators who in good faith but mistakenly believe that 
the busines s discussed at a closed meeting is "political" 
68 Nev . Rev . Stat . Se c tion 241 . 040 . 
69 
. d d b . A. 7 4 6 0, intro uce y Cammi ttee on Rules at r eque s t 
of Assemblyman Zimmer on May 4 , 1987. 
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rather than "public" would suffer no fine; but, for example, 
legislators who insist on keeping the meeting closed after 
learning that the Committee on Open Government had rendered 
an opinion that the business is in fact "public" would act 
at their peril. 
D. Courts Shoulq Have Power to Void An 
Action After Substantial Deliberations 
Held in Violation of the Open Meetings Law 
The Commission perceives no justification fo r 
omitting a remedy for cases where public bodies hold private 
meetings in which the true issues are debated and resolved, 
and then appear in a perfunctory open meeting to take the 
action previously decided. The Commission therefore 
recommends that courts be authorized to void an action of a 
public body not only if the action is taken in violation of 
the Open Meetings Law but also if substantial deliberations 
relating to the action are held in violation of that law. 70 
70This change could possibly be implemented by changing 
the second sentence of subdivision one of Section 107 t o 
read 
the court shal 1 have the power , in its 
disc retion , upon good cause s hown, to 
declare a ny action void, in whole or in 
part, . when that action, or substantial 
de liberations relating thereto, was 
(Footnote Continue d ) 
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In a case where a court has voided such an action, the 
public body would not be precluded from arriving at the same 
result after it had gone through the full deliberative and 
voting process in compliance with the Open Meetings Law. 
the Open 
E. Consideration Should Be Given to 
Expanded Public Hearings 
The recommendations which we have made to amend 
Meetings Law may not be enough. Serious 
consideration should be given to requiring public hearings 
at the county, city, town, and village levels where items of 
significant import are discussed. Despite strengthening the 
Open Meetings Law, there may still be too much private 
discussion of signi f icant p ubl i c issues , even without 
circumvention of the amended provisions. There is 1 i t tle 
logic in requiring a . public hear i ng (where the public c a n 
ask questions and demand answers) when a local l a w is being 
passed which may be of minor significance, but re quiring 
only an open meeting where decisions are being ma de which 
may be of maximum significance. For exampl e , we questi on 
why a public h ea ring must p r e c e de p a ssa g e of a l ocal law 
(Footnote Continued) 
take n o r he l d i n viola t ion o f thi s 
article . 
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requiring a minor increase in fees or fines, while a 
municipality can commit to spend millions of dollars on a 
new project without public participation. 
We do not suggest that such hearings be h e1 d in 
place of open caucuses of the majority of the legislative 
body, for al though public hearings permit the public to 
speak, they do not require the members of the public body to 
reveal the basis of their votes. 
We recommend consideration of requiring public 
hearings at the lucal level whenever public benefits or 
expenditures 
considered. 
of a significant magnitude 
While the threshold size of the 
are being 
benefit or 
expenditure may vary depending upon the level of government, 
such an amendment would serve to strengthen our recommended 
amendments of the Open Meetings Law and diminish the 
. likelihood of efforts to circumvent the strengthened 
provisions. 
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CONCLUSION 
Open meet ings, like democracy itself, are not 
always pleasant or convenient. Yet they are no less 
valuable for that fact. As one witness testified, "[Y]es, 
it is uncomfortable to vo~e yourself a pay raise in public. 
Yes~ it is uncomfortable to talk about a school with 
asbestos in it in front of anxious parents. Yes, it is un-
comfortable to talk about where to locate low income housing 
when you have people in the audience who might live next to 
the site, but, whoever said democracy had to be easy or 
comfortable? 1171 
The current open meetings law falls far short of 
72 the ideal, at least as portrayed in one University study. 
More significant than any rank on a university survey, 
however, is the corrosive effect of the present inadequacies 
of the Open Meetings Law upon the public's perception of th e 
integrity of their local governments. Every time a citizen 
71 Tr. a t 370. 
72B . t t r a man, Su ns hine Laws From the 5 0 S a es_: ~ ~~s::_!._ru~ , 
Hubert H. Humphrey I ns ti tute of Public Affairs (July 1984 ). 
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sees a closed meeting as a cloak for misconduct, democracy 
suffers. That perception alone, we believe, would justify 
the proposed changes to the Open Meetings Law. Buttressed 
by all the other reasons set forth above, the argument for 
those changes becomes irrefutable. 
Dated: New York, New York 
December 21, 1987 
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APPENDIX A 
PUBLIC OFFICERS LAW, ARTICLE 7 
OPEN MEETINGS LAW 
Section 100. Legislative declaration. 106. Minutes. 
101. Short title. 107. Enforcement. 
102. Definitions. 108. Exemptions. 
103. Open meetings and executive sessions. 
I 04. Public notice. 
109. Committee on open government. 
110. Construction with other laws. 
105. Conduct of executive sessions. 
§100. Legislative declaration. It is essential to the 
maintenance of a democratic society that the public 
business be performed in an open and public manner and 
that the citizens of this st(\te be fully aware of and able to 
observe the performance of public officials and attend 
and listen to the deliberations and decisions that go into 
the making of public policy. The people must be able to 
remain informed if they are to retain control over those 
who are their public servants. lt is the only climate under 
which the commonweal will prosper and enable the 
governmental process to operate for the benefit of those 
who created it. 
§101. Short Title. This article shall be known and may 
be cited as "Open Meetings Law". 
§102. Definitions. As used in this article. I. "\1eet· 
ing" means the official convening of a public body for 
the purposl! of conducting pu blic business. 
2. "Public body" means any entity, fo r which a 
quorum is required in order to conduct public business 
and which consists oi two or more members, perfo rmin g 
a governmental function for the state or for an :igency or 
department thereof, or for a public corporation as def in-
ed in section sixty-six oi the general construct ion law, or 
committee or subcommittee or other sim ilar body of such 
public body. 
3. "Executive session" me:ins that port ion of a 
meeting not open to the general public. 
§103. Open meetings and executive sessions. 
(a) Every meeting of a public body shall be open to the 
general public, except that an executi ve session o f such 
body may be called Jnd business transacted th ereat in Jc-
cordance with section one hundred of th is J rt icle. 
(b) Public bodies shall make or CJ.u se to ::i e m;:ide J! I 
reasonable efforts lO ensure th;:u meetin [!s J re helJ 1n 
facilities that perm!! bJmer-lree ph:1s1cJ J Jccess to the 
physicall y hand1cJpp ed. JS de fi ned 1n subd1v1s1on live o l 
section fifty o f the public bui!Jin.;s IJw. 
§1 ~. Pub lic nouce. I. Public notice o i !~c r::nc JnJ 
place of J rneeun g schedu led J t le Jst one week ori or 
th ereto shall be given to the n ev.i ~ meJ1a Jnd shJll be con-
1p1cuously posted in o ne or more des1gn:ited punl1c 1ocJ-
t1 on s al leJ st sevent y- two ho ur s befo re eJc n me::lln~. 
2. Publi c notice o f lh e lime Jnd plJce o r evr:ry o rr. rr 
meeun g shall be ~ 1 v en. to the n rcnt prarnc:i ble . :o the 
news med1J and shall be co nspicuously posreu 1n one or 
more J es11rn J teJ pubi1c lo cJt1 ons Jl .1 roson J ck :11;;e 
prio r tnerer o . 
111. Severability. 
3. The public notice provided for by this :ection shall 
not be construed to require publication as a legai not ice. 
§ 105. Conduct of executive sessions. 1. Upon :i. ma-
jority vote of its total membership, taken in Jn open 
meeting pursuant to a motion identifying the general area 
or areas of the sub ject or sub jects to be considered, a 
public body may conduct an executive ses:: :or: for the 
below enumerated purposes only, provided . how ever, 
that no action by formal vote shall be take:i to ap-
propriate public moneys: 
a. matters which will imperil the pub lic safe ty if 
disclosed; 
b. any matter which may disclose the identity of a law 
enforcement agent or informer; 
c. information relating to current or futu re investiz:J.-
tion or prosecution oi a criminal o ffense which would im-
peril effective law enfo rcement if disclosed; 
d. discussions regard ing proposed . pendinr, or curr em 
Ii tigation; 
e. collective negotia tions pursuant to art icle iouneen 
of the civil service Jaw; 
f. the medical, financial. credit or employment histcrv 
of a particular person or corporation. or mat :.:rs k::iding 
to the appointment, employment, prom otion . dem otion, 
discipline, suspension, dismissJI or removal ci a :::ia r-
ticular person or corporation; · 
g. the preparation , grading or :i.dministrJ:io n o i ex -
aminations; :i. nd 
h. the proposed acquisition, sal e or lease ci re:i l ::irop-
erty or the pro posed acq ui sit io n o i secu rities. e r sJk o r 
exc han ge o f sec uriti es hel d bv such public bcuv . :Cut oniv 
when pu blicit y would substanii:i lly :i. ifect t~~ v3iu~ 
thereo f. 
:. Att enda nce J t an executive se s~1on 'i hJll ~~ e ce rm:: -
ted to JnV membe r Ol the puDlic bOLi '.' J.r.J :in ·; Otn c:- ~, .. _ 
>o ns J utho r1 zcd by the public boJv. · .- - · 
q l06. \!inures. l . .\ l inutes sh:il l be tJkcn ..;t ::: I oc c;. 
meet1n~s of J pub lic bodv wn1 ch 'lh Jl l con<;1 s1 ,) f J rc ·~:.:rc.: 
o r summ ::iry o l JI ! mor1ons . : iror:o ~ Jls . resoiu t:;.;n<; ::::~c 
.inv othe r rnJ tt er formJJ ly voteLI upo n Jnu tn c ,·o :c 
th ereon. 
2 . .\! inu res shJ I! be t:ikcn J t necut11·e scss 1uns ol J!l'-' 
Jct1on th::i t 1s tJkcn bv lo rmJ l vo te "' n1ch snJ1l cor.sist 0 1 
J record or summJrv o f the fi nJI ~c: '.::rmin:i t1 ·J :l c l '> Uc:i 
Jct1o n, Jnd rhe J:ite :ind 1ore ::lereon: ; ro1·1d ed . 
ho1, c:ve r. thJ l such su mmJry nr r d n,1 1 1ncluuc .:n1 r ~.:11 rc r 
·' n1c n 1s no t rcqu1rcrJ :o r' c: mJc: r ;-u r'I :,· bv r:lr: ": :: ·..: L' rn o f 
.n!Orm :l:!O n iJ W J<; J~__;C::J bl J[!J~ : c 'I\ ,J I ;;: 1; c· :-._ ;'ICf . 
3. Minutes of meetings of all public bodies shall be 
available to the public in accordance with the provisions 
of the freedom oi information law within two weeks 
from the date of such meeting except that minutes taken 
pursuant to subdivision two hereoi shall be available to 
the public within one week from the date oi the executive 
session. 
§107. Enforcement. 1. Any aggrieved person shall 
have standing to enforce the provisions of this article 
against a public body by the commencement of a pro-
ceeding pursuant to article seventy-eight of the civil prac-
tice law and rules. and/or an action for declaratory judg-
ment and injunctive relief. In any such action or pro-
ceeding, the court shall have the power. in its discretion. 
upon good cause shown, to declare any action or part 
thereof taken in violation of this article void in whole or 
in part. 
An unintentional failure to fully comply with the 
notice provisions required by this article shall not alone 
be grounds for invalidating any action taken at a meeting 
of a public body. The provisions of this article shall not 
affect the validity of the authorization. acquisition, ex-
ecution or disposition of a bond issue or notes. 
2. In any proceeding brought pursuant to this section, 
costs and reasonable attorney fees may be awarded by the 
court, in its discretion, to the successful party. 
3. The statute of limitations in an article seventy-eight 
proceeding with respect to an action taken at executive 
session shall commence to run from the date the minutes 
of such executive session have been made available to the 
public. 
§108. Exemptions. Nothing contained in this anicle 
shall be construed as extending the provisions hereof to: 
1. judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings. except pro-
ceedings of the public service commission and zoning 
boards of appeals; 
2. a. deliberations of political committees, confer-
ences and caucuses. 
b. for purposes of this section, the deliberations of 
political committees, conferences and caucuses means a 
private meeting of members of the senate or assembly of 
the state of New York, or the legislative body of a coun-
ry, city, town or village, who are members or adherents 
of the same political party, without regard to (i) the sub-
ject matter under discussion, including discussions of 
public business, (ii) the ma1ority or minority status of 
such political committees. conierences and caucuses or 
(iii) whether such politic:il co rnmlttecs, co niercncc:s and 
caucuses invite staff or guests to pa ruci pate in their 
deli berations; and 
3. any matter made confidential by federal or st::it e 
law. 
§109. Committee on open governrnrn t. Th e commit-
tee on open government. cre::ited by par::i.;r::ipn (a) of sub -
division one of section e1 gh ty-n1ne of this chapter, rn::i tl 
issu e advisory opinions from urne to rime as , in its discre -
tion, may b:: required to inform puolic bo<.J 1cs and pa-
sons of the interpretations of the provisions o f the op en 
meetings Jaw. 
~I IO. Co nstr uct1o n wHh ort:er IJ \.l.S. I .. \nv :;ro\1S1on 
of a ch:utcr, adm1n1srrat1> c co~c. loca l !aw, ord1nancc, o r 
rule or regulation affecting a public body which is man 
restrictive with respect to public access than illis anicl: 
shall be deemed superseded hereby to the extc-.~ c:iat su::: 
provision is more restrictive than this article. 
2. Any provision of general, special or lcci '. ::iw o 
charter, administrative code, ordinance. or ·TUle 0 
regulation less restrictive with respect to puotic a~ 
than this article shall not be det:med supersec::d hereby;- -
3. Notwithstanding any provision of th.i~ article to L': 
contrary, a public body may adopt provisions less resuic 
tive with respect to public access than this arr-:,;!::. 
§ 111. Severability. If any provision of this artic ic.: c. 
the application thereof to any person or circt:mstances : 
adjudged invalid by a court of competent jurisdictior. 
such judgment shall not affect or impair the validity c 
the other provisions of the anicle or the appticatic 
thereof to other persons and circumstances. 
·.) 
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~IX B 
Witnesses Testifying, and D::x::uments SUbmitt ed , 
at the Public Hearings of the 
New York State Commission on Government Inteqrity 
in Rochester, New York 
November 4 and 5, 1987 
Thomas P. Ryan, Jr., M.ayor, City of Rcc.hester (Transcript !_:2.?es 
Robert J. Freeman, Executive Director, New· York State Cormnit~~ --::: Open Government (pages 55-124). 
Gerald .Benjamin, Professor of .Political Science, State Colle:.ce e:.t: 
New Paltz, and Majority Leader, Ulster County Legislature (pages 124- 169). 
John D. Kutzer, Executive Director, ~;er .. 1 Yor}: ~rewspaper Publi:::_-:ers Association (pages 172-203). 
Susan Sc.."r.vardt, Vice President, New York: Sbte Le2oue cf :·:c:r.-en ~1oters (pages 203-224) . 
W.vard c. Farrell , Executive Director , New York Conferer.ce cf 
and Other Municipal Officials (pages 224 - 293 ). 
G. Jeffrey R..al:er , Executive Secretary, ,:',sscci2tion of Tc-.-lr.s c: :·2 -.. 1 York State (pages 224 - 293) . 
E.dwin L. Crawford, Executive Director, ;Je'" York State 1'.sscci<J.tic:-. c:: Counties (pages 224-293). 
293-307) . 
J07- ~ 52) . 
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Jean M. Carrozzi, Member, Rochester City Council . (pages 412-459) . 
John Erb, Member, Rochester City Council (pages 459-474). 
Ruth H. Scott, President, Rochester City Council (pages 47 4- :52 :::) . 
522-552). Paul E. Haney, former Member, Rochester City Council (pages 
Warren rbrenrus, Director of Community Affairs, WHEC-TV '. ;;.c.c;es 
John D. Lynn, Common cause (pages 58 1-586). 
Statenents by the Witnesses. 
'' 
State:rrent from the New York State Scx::iety of Newspaper Editors. 
Monroe County Legislature Resolution No. 279 of 1986 (Auc;t.:s::. : , 
1986) , Urging the Governor and the Legislature of the State of New '!-J:::.--:-: tc 
P.bolish the May 1985 Amendment to the Open Meetings Law, submi t::.ei by :; c;:.:-.:-:'2 
D. Van Zandt, President, Monroe County Legislature. 
